ACADEMIC

Work in Progress

• On the Myth of Psychotherapy (please email for a copy)

• Derealization: A Naive Realist Account (please email​ for a copy)

 

Forthcoming

• Co-authored with Ian Phillips. A Change of Perspective: Naïve Realism and Normal Variation. In O. Beck & F. Masrour (Eds.), The Relational View of Perception: New Essays. Routledge.

 

2023

• Co-authored with Ian Phillips. Naive Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science. In J. Cohen & B. McLaughlin (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.

 

2022

• Review of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience by David Papineau. Philosophical Review, 131(4), 523–528.

 

2021

• Co-authored with Tim Crane. The Problem of Perception. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 

 

2020

• Naive realism, Representationalism, and the Rationalizing Role of Visual Perception. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), 102–119.

• Co-authored with Ian Phillips. Austerity and Illusion. Philosophers' Imprint, 20(15), 1–19.

• Review of The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence by Susanna Schellenberg. Mind, 129(513), 339–349.

 

2019

• Co-authored with Anil Gomes. How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience. Philosophical Quarterly, 69(274), 41–63.

• Epistemological Disjunctivism and Its Representational Commitments. In D. Pritchard, C. Doyle, & J. Milburn (Eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.

 

2018

• Bálint’s Syndrome, Object Seeing, and Spatial Perception. Mind and Language, 33(3), 221–241.

• Naive Realism and Diaphaneity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118(2), 149–175.

• Co-authored with Lee Walters. The Invalidity of the Argument From Illusion. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(4), 357–364.

• Object Seeing and Spatial Perception. In F. Macpherson & F. Dorsch (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.

 

2016​​

• Idiosyncratic Perception. Philosophical Quarterly, 66(263), 391–399.

• The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1), 86–104.

• Co-authored with Anil Gomes. On the Particularity of Experience. Philosophical Studies, 173(2), 451–460.

• Co-authored with Anil Gomes. Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta.

• Review of The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Perception. M. Matthen (Ed.). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

 

2015

• Review of Objectivity and the Parochial by Charles Travis. Mind, 124(494), 693–696.

• Review of Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology by F. Macpherson and D. Platchias. Analysis, 75(3), 528–530.

• Pathology Based Philosophy of Mind. iCog.

 

2014

• Knowledge and Ways of Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114(3pt3), 353–364.

• Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily. Ratio, 27(4), 393–413.

 

2013

• Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P. Synthese, 190(10), 1735–1751.

 

2012

• Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge? Theoria, 78(2), 115–127.

• Visual Perception as a Means of Knowing. Doctoral Thesis. UCL.